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We assess the efficiency of the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market by investigating how sovereign CDS spreads react to
macroeconomic news announcements. Contrary to the vast majority of the existing literature, one of our main findings supports
the hypothesis that news announcements reduce market uncertainty and, thus, that both better- and worse-than-expected news
lower CDS prices during our sample period. In addition, we find that CDS spreads respond differently to the four macroindicators
across the three different regions. Our findings might help investors in these areas to interpret the surprises of macronews
announcements when making decisions in CDS markets.
1. Introduction
Sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) are deemed to accu-
rately capture the inherent credit risk within a country’s
economy.&e sovereign CDSmarket has been under intense
scrutiny in the last decade, following the European sovereign
debt crisis that started in 2008 with the collapse of Iceland’s
banking system and then spread to other countries such as
Greece and Portugal during 2009. Whether the spread of
sovereign CDS can efficiently reflect the risk related to a
country’s economy is of great importance [1]. In this paper,
we conduct an event study to assess the efficiency of the
sovereign CDS market by investigating how the sovereign
CDS spread reacts to four types of macroeconomic news:
gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI),
unemployment rate, and consumer sentiment announce-
ments. Our empirical study also aims to test whether news
announcements increase or decrease the uncertainty of the
sovereign CDS market.
Our paper fits into two streams in the literature. &e first
is the study of the financial markets’ reactions to macro news
announcements. For instance, Andersen et al. [2] investi-
gated the incorporation of macroeconomic fundamentals
into different security prices and found that the dynamics of
the exchange rates are linked to fundamentals. Balduzzi et al.
[3] consider the effect of 26 macroeconomic variables on the
US Treasury bond prices ascertaining the significance of 17
public releases as well as an aftermath drift due to the new
information. Bond prices are investigated by Beetsma et al.
[4] who found that bond yield spreads are deemed to be
volatile during announcement speeches with consistent
spillover effects. Andritzky et al. [5], Arru et al. [6], and
Kurov and Stan [7] modeled the bond volatilities in
emerging markets and the US bond market. Vrugt [8] tested
whether macroeconomic announcements play a role in the
determination of conditional means, variances, and co-
variances in the stock and bond markets. &e answer is
affirmative, and the author also found a postannouncement
drift towards the direction of the news.
&e second stream focuses on the sovereign CDS spread
and is relatively newer than the first stream but still includes
a broad range of studies performed in the past two decades.
For instance, Heinz and Sun [9] and Chebbi and Sarraj [10]
investigated the variables underlying the movements of the
sovereign CDS spreads focusing on the Euro area countries
after the subprimemortgage financial crises.&ey found that
the sovereign market moves from three different viewpoints:
global investor sentiment proxied by the VIX index, the
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liquidity in the CDS market represented by the CDS bid-ask
spreads, and a set of macroeconomic indicators such as the
GDP growth rate, predicted fiscal deficit, and forecast of
current account balance and public debt to GDP ratio. All
these factors are highly significant in the determination of
the sovereign market movements both before and after 2012.
Longstaff et al. [11] investigated the sovereign credit risk by
CDS and bond yield spreads between 2007 and 2010. &ey
found theoretical evidence of global factors, risk premiums,
and investment flows accounting for movements in the
sovereign credit risk more than the country-specific factors
such as macroeconomic fundamentals. Narayan and Ban-
nigidadmath [12] found that CDS spreads changes are
dominated by forecasting models that use positive news as a
predictor.
Our paper complements the extant macroeconomic
news and sovereign CDS theoretical contributions. It ad-
ditionally deepens the knowledge about the sovereign CDS
premiums’ behaviour. We take inspiration from related
studies, yet our work differs from the previous studies in
some aspects.
Specifically, instead of using straight news announce-
ments, we focus on the way that better/worse-than-expected
news (i.e., news surprise) affects sovereign CDS quotes.
Better/worse-than-expected news contains a greater/smaller
released value than the economic consensus. By analysing
the effects of news in this manner, it is possible to test the
informational efficiency of the market and the promptitude
with which sovereign CDS prices incorporate new
information.
Additionally, the majority of the past works including
the aforementioned papers typically concentrate on the
determinants of market returns or CDS spread and employ
regression analysis to test the significance of multiple var-
iables. In this paper, we employ an event study approach that
allows us to evaluate not only the overall magnitude of the
effect on the announcement day but also the effect in the
long run. To the best of our knowledge, to date, no event
study that focuses on the global sovereign CDS market and
public news surprises about contingent countries’ funda-
mentals has been performed. &erefore, we mainly base this
work on few reference studies trying to advance with respect
to the analytic procedures and interpretations of the eco-
nomic results. Greatrex [13] conducts an event study that
investigates the CDS and stock corporate markets’ efficiency
in absorbing corporate earnings surprises. &e authors
found that news has a significant impact on both markets
and that CDS prices are inversely correlated with good and
bad news. Furthermore, market efficiency is examined, and
it is reported that both CDS and stock prices anticipate the
news as confirmed by abnormal returns. Kim et al. [14] carry
out an analysis based on the domestic and spillover news
effect on the US, China, and the eurozone sovereign CDS
market. In addition to the central focus on the international
responses to domestic news, they ascertain that good news
has an economic and statistically greater impact on CDS
prices than bad news.
For the sake of developing a deeper understanding of
what drives sovereign CDS premiums, this study aims to
address 3 main research questions that are based on the
conventional literature intuitions proposed by Beetsma et al.
[4] and Conrad et al. [15] and go beyond them, focusing the
analysis on the specific macroeconomic indicators as de-
scribed in Heinz and Sun [9]:
First, we note that there is some very recent literature on
the effects of news announcement from an information
theoretic approach. For instance, Ehrmann et al. [16] found
that release of public information may increase or decrease
the uncertainty of the market, depending on how central
banks reflect the news. See also Kurov and Stan [7] for
empirical results on reactions of equity and the crude oil
market to the fluctuations of uncertainty due to the release of
macro news. Since the sovereign CDS market is supposed to
capture the risk related to a country’s economic environ-
ments, we hypothesise that the announcement of the four
macroeconomic indicators will reduce the uncertainty and
thus lower the CDS price. Second, we also check if individual
variables are effective enough to produce abnormal CDS
spread changes. &ird, we investigated whether the reaction
of the CDS market to macroeconomic fundamentals is the
same across three geographic regions, namely, Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region, and the American
and Asian Pacific countries.
&e event study enables us to obtain the following in-
teresting findings. Better-than-expected news and worse-
than-expected news both lower sovereign credit default swap
prices within the sample interval. &is finding appears odd,
and we give some explanations for this finding below.
However, the magnitude of the effect does vary with ref-
erence to the event window considered. &e reaction to
positive surprises is valued more by market participants than
negative deviations. Moreover, single macroeconomic fun-
damentals provoke different drifts in the credit derivative
market quotations. Gross domestic product and unem-
ployment rate announcements reflecting the current eco-
nomic situation are found to be ineffective in conditioning
CDS prices. In contrast, consumer price index and consumer
sentiment releases have a robust effect over the estimated
economic period. Macroregional factors represent a further
viewpoint from which to evaluate the impact of news. &e
EMEA region is more receptive to negative releases, whereas
American and Asian countries appear to need longer to
incorporate the news with evidence of informational leaks.
Overall, we try to obtain evidence that the subprime
mortgage financial crisis and the European sovereign debt
crisis had a significant impact on the perception of news
announcement by the market. &e fact that macroeconomic
fundamentals’ impact on security prices is time-varying is
unanimously agreed upon in the literature. Hence, it seems
worthwhile to extend the past research and examine whether
the effectiveness of the considered variables has substantially
changed over time.
&e remainder of this paper is organised as follows. &e
dataset and news indices are given in Section 2. &e
employed methodology to answer the three questions
mentioned above is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 gives the
main results of the event study, while Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Complexity
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1. CDS Spread Patterns and Changes. &e global sample
takes into account sovereign CDS historical prices down-
loaded from &omson Reuters DataStream. We select the
average bid-ask quotations of sovereign CDS premiums,
denominated in EUR and USD, with a 5-year maturity
written on a senior debt reference obligation. &is choice is
because 5-year maturity assets are the most liquid and traded
in the sovereign CDS market and are the dataset with
continuous time observations. &e number of contributors
and the bid-ask spread generally represent two proxies for
CDS market liquidity. Hence, the 5-year credit default swap
exhibits a smaller bid-ask differential than longer maturities.
&e sample consists of 18 countries, representing 3 different
macroregions: ten EMEA countries (France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Ukraine,
Russia, and Turkey), as well as four American countries
(Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.), and four Asian
Pacific countries (Australia, China, Indonesia, and Philip-
pines.). &e average of the daily CDS premiums is shown in
Figure 1. &e selection of the countries is the result of an
accurate picking-up process. First, the countries have been
chosen based on the availability of historical CDS prices.&e
second factor is the frequency of the key fundamentals’
statements. For the nations in the sample, both the an-
nounced value and economic consensus of the specific
macroeconomic indicator are reported. Moreover, the
susceptibility to news played an important role in the de-
termination of the series as well as the geographical location
of the aforementioned states. Last, all the countries in the
sample appear in the member list of the two sovereign CDS
indices that we use to compute the market return proxy.
Although a large part of literature has focused on the
analysis of CDS spread responsiveness to news during the
subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent months, we
concentrate on the economic period (June 1, 2009, to June 1,
2016) that coincides with the European sovereign debt crisis
and its consequences over the following years to date.
By examining the CDS prices at level, we can spot similar
macroregional patterns within the analysed time period.
EMEA region countries show a recovery trend from the
subprime mortgage crisis in the first sample half and are
characterised by the European sovereign debt crisis in the
second half. Focusing on individual countries, Germany
presents the lowest mean CDS spreads, with 25.20 basis
points per annum (bps) over the analysis period, whereas
Greece exhibits the highest values (2904.02 bps). American
countries exhibit low volatility between 2010 and 2015.
However, these countries show an interesting downturn that
began in the second half of 2015 due to a sharp depreciation
of home currencies, an increase in foreign exchange market
volatility, and a plunge in oil prices. Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico present a similar level of riskiness, with a mean CDS
spread of 185.73 bps, 152.17 bps, and 135.96 bps, respec-
tively, whereas Venezuela stands out with an average of
2041.56 bps as it has recently experienced economic distress
due to oil supply and prices. Asian countries are more
tranquil. Insurance on Australian and Chinese issued debt
(respectively, 51.53 bps and 95.50 bps as average annually
paid premium) is found to be less risky than Indonesian and
Philippine reference obligations (respectively, 203.79 bps
and 142.90 bps on average).
For the purpose of the analysis, following Andres et al.
[17] and Bouzgarrou and Chebbi [18], we define the daily
relative spread changes as
ΔSCi,t � ln SCi,t􏼐 􏼑 − ln SCi,t−1􏼐 􏼑, (1)
where SCi,t is the level of CDS spread for country i at time t.
Descriptive statistics for ΔSCi,t are shown in Table 1. It is
important to note that consistent with the literature ([14, 19],
among others), CDS daily relative spread changes are
nonnormally distributed, are either positively or negatively
skewed, and exhibit excess kurtosis.
2.2. CDS Indices. For the event study investigating abnormal
change in the CDS spread, we need to obtain the normal
CDS performance. For this purpose, we compute an ad hoc
market return index as the normal CDS spread:
I �
iTraxx SWE index + CDX index
2
. (2)
So, I is the average of two of the main sovereign CDS
indices quoted daily by the Markit: iTraxx SOVX Western
Europe (SWE) and CDX index (indices taken from
Bloomberg.). &e first index contains 14 of the most relevant
Western European countries in the member list, and the
CDX index specifically applies to emerging markets (the
Markit iTraxx SOVX Western Europe index is composed of
the credit default swaps written on the following countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, &e
Netherlands, and United Kingdom. &e reference entities
composing the Markit CDX Index are as follows: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, the Philippines, Turkey,
Russia, and Venezuela). &e reason behind this choice is
motivated by the fact that with the exception of the USA and
Australia, all the sample countries are listed in the member
count of the indices. Hence, averaging the two indices en-
ables us to represent the general level of normal return of the
studied CDS sovereign market as a whole.
2.3.NewsAnnouncements. Although the vast majority of the
literature takes into account forward-looking indicators, we
assess the CDS premiums’ reaction to the gross domestic
product, consumer price index, unemployment rate, and
consumer sentiment announcements. &ere are several
reasons behind this choice. First, we want to test whether
economic publication reflecting the current health of the
economy can cause abnormal CDS spread changes in the
sovereign market. Second, recalling that both CDS quota-
tions and sovereign bond yield spreads can be used as in-
dicators for country-specific default risk, we investigate
whether the principal bond yield movers, as outlined in
Goldberg and Leonard [20], can account for the movements
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in the national CDS market. &ird, as explained by the
European Commission in the “Key Economic Indicators”
report, the variables represent four different key macro-
economic indicators. Whereas GDP and CPI are the most
relevant indicators for the national output and prices, un-
employment rate and consumer sentiment are proxies for
the labour market and private consumption. We exclude the
announcements with a lower value than 60% in the
Bloomberg relevance index (the Bloomberg relevance index
shows the country-related percentage of importance given to
a specific news announcement). According to the employed
methodology, we are only concerned about the specific
variable’s releasing date, expectation, and realisation.
To overcome the problem of different units of mea-
surement among the variables and facilitate meaningful
comparisons, we apply the approach in Balduzzi et al. [3]






where Sk,t is the standardised news value of the indicator k at
time t, Ak,t is the actual and unrevised announcement of the
indicator k at time t, Ek,t is the Bloomberg survey median for
the release of indicator k at time t used as the expected value
(Vrugt [8] suggests that the economic consensus is usually
accurate as it is computed through a transparent process.
&e expectations are collected through surveys and it is
easily possible to differentiate the analysts’ individual per-
spectives. Once the predicted values are gathered, the me-
dian of the sample will represent what it is known as “market
economic consensus” for a particular variable.) based on
information available Ωt−1 prior to the releases of the in-
dicator, and σk is the standard deviation of (Ak,t − Ek,t) over
the sample period.
To clarify the news standardisation procedure, consider
an example where k � GDP. On September 28, 2011, the
quarterly announced French GDP year-over-year (YoY)
value was Ak,t � 0.017. &is observation compared to the
expected economic consensus Ek,t � 0.016 based on the
public information gives a differential of 0.001. Considering
that the differential is positive, we can interpret it as a release
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the CDS relative spread changes.
Country/stat. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Observations
Australia 51.5334 185.0000 25.0000 22.9668 2.3237 10.2637 1935
Brazil 185.7271 500.7400 90.9200 93.2134 1.5661 4.5322 1935
China 95.4965 259.5000 52.0000 32.2197 1.9379 8.2059 1935
Colombia 152.1739 499.1804 73.8500 68.8704 2.1985 8.9345 1935
France 50.8484 171.5600 14.0060 33.0462 1.3910 4.2849 1935
Germany 25.2047 92.5000 6.6400 16.8817 1.1769 4.0890 1935
Greece 2904.0200 26466.1700 102.9000 4565.8880 2.9355 12.5862 1935
Indonesia 203.7914 700.0000 124.7800 96.2232 3.2830 14.6363 1935
Italy 166.5527 498.6599 48.0000 102.1450 1.4038 4.1151 1935
Mexico 135.9627 491.6130 64.1700 60.8877 2.8531 13.1588 1935
Philippines 142.9045 485.0000 80.4000 64.6305 2.5458 10.9291 1935
Portugal 359.4365 1521.4500 37.0000 321.3420 1.4492 4.0329 1935
Russia 227.9381 793.2000 105.7100 122.1865 2.2847 9.3000 1935
Spain 160.7141 492.0698 45.4200 101.5039 0.9712 3.1203 1935
Turkey 196.7231 515.1567 99.9160 62.7601 1.8561 8.7117 1935
UK 47.9505 165.0000 11.6600 27.3410 1.1637 4.9223 1935
Ukraine 1231.7000 8943.8200 409.1700 987.3895 2.4701 10.4437 1935











01/01/2009 01/01/2010 01/01/2011 01/01/2012 01/01/2013 01/01/2014 01/01/2015 01/01/2016
Figure 1: Mean daily CDS spreads for the sample countries.
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of positive surprise.&erefore, we can categorise it as positive
news. Considering that the computed sample standard de-
viation is σk � 0.00064, we obtain Sk,t � 1.56. As another
example, we can compute the standardised Germanmonthly
unemployment rate news published on October 27, 2010,
which is Sk,t � 1.52. Since a greater unemployment rate than
the economic forecast indicates a negative outlook, we can
interpret this result as negative news.
&ese numerical examples help to provide an overview of
how we categorise the announced value.&e next step in our
methodology is the determination of a threshold that rep-
resents a delimiting point in the computation of the positive,
negative, and no news indices. Since many studies such as
that of Greatrex [13] use a threshold of ±2.5%, which is
adapted to the specific conducted analysis, we set this value
at ±0.455. We compute this ad hoc delimiter because the
absolute value of the range of positive standardised news
goes from 0 to 3.46, whereas that for negative news goes
from 0 to 4.69.&erefore, we want to create indices that have
as balanced a number of observations as possible in order to
avoid biasing our estimation because of a disproportionate
news dataset (if we use the same delimiters as Greatrex [13],
we will have a very unbalanced pool of good news and bad
news).
&e first index takes into account the statements in
which the released value overperforms the expectation.
&erefore, we refer to this index as the “good” or “better than
expected” news index. Mathematically, we only count
standardised surprise values greater than 0.455. Economi-
cally, we include greater than expected GDP and consumer
confidence values and smaller than expected CPI and un-
employment rate observations. In contrast, we estimate a
“bad” or “worse than expected” news index using lower than
expected GDP and consumer confidence value as well as
greater than expected CPI and unemployment rate. In this
case, the delimiter is the ad hoc computed value −0.455. As
stated above, this specific value is not taken from the lit-
erature. Hence, we reasonably introduce an alternative
approach in order to check if it will lead to additional
economically significant results. &e better-than-expected
news index comprises 970 announcements, whereas 775
releases compose the worse-than-expected news index. All
the remaining announcements that are not part of the
aforementioned indices are labelled “no news” because of a
lack of effectiveness on the CDS spreads.&ese values are not
taken into account in the analysis.
Tables 2 and 3 show the news announcements for each
country grouped by the respective macroregions.
3. Methodology
&e methodology that we employ to test the effects of
macroeconomic announcements on the sovereign CDS
prices is an event study that aims tomeasure the impact of an
event on financial asset prices or firm’s value.&e first task in
an event study is the determination of the occurrence to
investigate over a predetermined period known as the event
window. Consistent with Greatrex [13], the main event
window [−1; 1] starts one trading day before the event date
and ends on the subsequent day. Additionally, we extend the
event window [−20; 20] to 20 trading days before and after
the event date. &e usefulness of a very short window can be
identified from the fact that given the informational ratio-
nality of the market, security prices will reflect the new
events immediately. Moreover, it is possible to evaluate the
investor’s reaction after the market closes. A longer ob-
servation interval will allow us to test the efficiency of the
CDS sovereign market through the detection of information
leaks, nonimmediate effects, and premiums drifts.
&e estimation window starts 100 trading days (we as-
sume that 100 trading days before the announcement rep-
resent a long enough time interval to estimate the normal
performance without the price pattern being affected by any
event effect. &e estimation window stops 21 trading days
prior the release day in order not to overlap with the pre-
announcement interval) before the event date and all of the
relevant dates are represented in Figure 2.
&e estimation window goes from 100 trading days to 21
days before the event date. A longer window takes into
account 20 trading days before and after the announcement,
whereas a shorter window only focuses on 3 trading days
around the release day.
&e next step in the event study procedure is the cal-
culation of the normal performance of the sovereign CDS.
&is is a fundamental part of the analysis and consists of
simulating what the CDS price path would have been
without the impact of the event. Many different approaches
for the computation of the normal performance have been
introduced in the literature, and we adopt the market model
cited in MacKinlay [21]. It first uses the data from the es-
timation period to regress the actual CDS spread changes
ΔSCi,t on a constant and the market index premiums
changes ΔIt, where It is defined as in (2):
ΔSCi,t � αi + βΔIt + εi,t, (4)
where εi,t is a homoscedastic disturbance term with zero
mean. In this case, we should not be concerned about the
overlapping effect between the different countries because
the normal performance is estimated independently for each
state.
Once the intercept and the beta coefficient are estimated,
we calculate the abnormal spread changes ΔASCi,t for each
announcement as
ΔASCi,t � ΔSCi,t − 􏽢αi − 􏽢βΔIt. (5)
&e last step consists of the calculation of the cumulative
abnormal spread changes (ΔCASC) of country i, which






Since there are 18 countries in the sample, we compute
ΔCASC for each country and then the average value. By
doing so, we estimate the cumulative average (in Sections 4.1
and 4.2, we take the average of all of the countries in our
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Table 3: Number of announcements for each American and Asian Pacific country.
Americas Asia Pacific
Variable Frequency N. events Variable Frequency N. events
Brazil Australia
GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (7, 12, 7) GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (12, 5, 9)
CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (18, 20, 39) CPI YoY Quarterly 26 (10, 5, 11)
UR Monthly 72 (32, 15, 25) UR Monthly 77 (37, 15, 25)
CS Monthly 5 (2, 2, 1) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
Colombia China
GDP YoY Quarterly 25 (8, 4, 13) GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (15, 6, 5)
CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (22, 23, 32) CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (29, 29, 19)
UR Monthly 77 (22, 22, 33) UR Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
CS Monthly 30 (8, 12, 10) CS Monthly 81 (15, 23, 43)
Mexico Indonesia
GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (6, 9, 11) GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (7, 5, 14)
CPI YoY Quarterly 76 (34, 23, 19) CPI YoY Quarterly 78 (31, 20, 27)
UR Monthly 77 (28, 25, 24) UR Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
CS Monthly 89 (22, 31, 36) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
Venezuela Philippines
GDP YoY Quarterly 19 (7, 4, 8) GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (10, 6, 10)
CPI YoY Quarterly 42 (10, 13, 19) CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (33, 12, 32)
UR Monthly 1 (1, 0, 0) UR Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
&is table shows the macroeconomic fundamentals announcements for each American and Asian Pacific country from June 1, 2009, to June 1, 2016.
Table 2: Number of announcements for each EMEA country.
Europe, Middle East, and Africa
Variable Frequency N. events Variable Frequency N. events
France Russia
GDP YoY Quarterly 25 (4, 6, 15) GDP YoY Quarterly 7 (3, 0, 4)
CPI YoY Quarterly 82 (38, 17, 27) CPI YoY Quarterly 72 (15, 8, 49)
UR Monthly 25 (11, 6, 8) UR Monthly 75 (30, 10, 35)
CS Monthly 146 (61, 49, 36) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
Germany Spain
GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (0, 0, 26) GDP YoY Quarterly 24 (4, 4, 16)
CPI YoY Quarterly 78 (1, 11, 66) CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (2, 14, 61)
UR Monthly 78 (23, 8, 47) UR Monthly 26 (6, 7, 13)
CS Monthly 178 (60, 47, 71) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
Greece Turkey
GDP YoY Quarterly 2 (1, 1, 0) GDP YoY Quarterly 25 (13, 5, 7)
CPI YoY Quarterly 12 (3, 5, 4) CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (23, 28, 26)
UR Monthly 48 (16, 9, 23) UR Monthly 51 (18, 15, 18)
CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0) CS Monthly 7 (3, 1, 3)
Italy United Kingdom
GDP YoY Quarterly 26 (8, 12, 6) GDP YoY Quarterly 77 (17, 31, 29)
CPI YoY Quarterly 76 (12, 14, 50) CPI YoY Quarterly 77 (25, 23, 29)
UR Monthly 25 (10, 5, 10) UR Monthly 77 (29, 16, 32)
CS Monthly 168 (59, 43, 66) CS Monthly 89 (26, 27, 36)
Portugal Ukraine
GDP YoY Quarterly 22 (7, 6, 9) GDP YoY Quarterly 0 (0, 0, 0)
CPI YoY Quarterly 46 (15, 11, 20) CPI YoY Quarterly 75 (11, 14, 50)
UR Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0) UR Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0) CS Monthly 0 (0, 0, 0)
&is table shows the macroeconomic fundamentals announcements for each EMEA country from June 1, 2009, to June 1, 2016. We report the name of the
variable, the frequency of the announcement, and the number of events. In the brackets, we express the number of better-than-expected news an-
nouncements, the number of worse-than-expected news announcements, and the announcements correctly anticipated by the market consensus.
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sample to investigate the overall reaction of the CDS spread
to macro news, while in Section 4.3, we take the average in
each region so that we can analyse the differences in the









Once the CAASC values are determined, we use different
test statistics to verify the significance of the changes. Specifi-
cally, we test H0: CAASC � 0 (i.e., the reaction is not signif-
icant) against the alternative H1: CAASC≠ 0 (i.e., the reaction
is significant).&erefore, we investigate whether the CDS prices
experience a significant variation due to a precise event against a
lack of a substantial reaction in the premiums path.
&e vast majority of the literature solely conducts a t-test.
However, further enquiries may be employed (the t-test is very
straightforward but is subject to cross-sectional correlation
and volatility changes, while the Patell test and BMP test are
both not influenced by the distribution of ASCs in the event
window and account for serial correlation and event-induced
volatility but appear to be generally prone to cross-sectional
correlation bias. Nonparametric tests do not require any
specific distribution of the spread changes and may thus be
more powerful than parametric tests. Nevertheless, the liter-
ature explains that the generalised sign test accounts for
skewness in the return distribution. &erefore, Andres et al.
[17] outlined the process steps for a robustness check, based on
Barber et al. [22] and Hull et al. [19]. &e procedure allows us
to correct for the distribution skewness and appears to lead to
an improvement in the test efficiency). &e adjusted Patell test
and Bohemer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (BMP) test are used in
our study. &ese statistics provide better estimates when the
variables are normally distributed. In fact, CDS spread changes
are positively or negatively skewed and have excess kurtosis.
&erefore, to check the validity of the results, we include
nonparametric tests. &e skewed adjusted test and generalised
sign test are components of those test families. A robustness
check consisting of the bootstrap methodology completes the
result verification. Data-driven nonparametric methods can
also avoid the potential problem of heterogeneity across
countries.
4. Empirical Results
In light of the research questions, we initially test the CDS
prices responses from June 1, 2009, to June 1, 2016, within
the main event windows [−20; 20], [−1; 1] and event date [0;
0]. Better/worse-than-expected news indices are assessed
separately, which is one of our main contributions. In
Tables 4–20, test statistics are reported, while we only
consider those significant results that are confirmed by at
least three out of six test statistics and at least one parametric
and nonparametric test. All the results undergo a robustness
check that is performed through a bootstrap process with
1000 resamples, and the bootstrapped p value is reported in
the last column of each table.
4.1. Reaction to Contingent News Announcements.
Table 4 shows that if we take the whole sample into account,
better-than-expected news lowers the CDS spreads. &is
result is consistent with previous studies such as Greatrex
[13], Heinz and Sun [9], and Kim et al. [14]. More specif-
ically, the magnitude of the cumulative average decrease is
236 basis points within a 3-day window around the event
date. &e statistical insignificance of the abnormal premium
changes on the release day makes us suspect that the sov-
ereign CDS market is characterised by information incor-
poration inefficiencies. &erefore, we extend the analysis to
the worse-than-expected news index.
Whereas the impact of good news is fully aligned with
the literature, the investigation of bad news effects leads to
the most interesting contribution of our research work, as
shown in Table 5. Even though the vast majority of the
literature point towards the opposite intuition, in the in-
vestigated sample that proxies for the CDS market as a
whole, we observe that worse-than-expected news lowers
CDS spreads. &ese findings suggest that the risk perception
decreases even when the released macroeconomic variables
underperform the analysts’ forecasts.&e effect of the impact
is small and not significant within the main event window
(−188 bps). However, it is considerable and highly significant
on the event date (−228 bps). &e last result is consistent
with Heinz and Sun [9] who found that CDS spreads tend to
react immediately to new information. Indeed, the news
component incorporation occurs instantly.
For the 41-day event window, both of the news indices
provoke abnormal patterns. &e effect is substantial and
negative, indicating that the sovereign CDS market fails the
efficiency test. &e prices’ underreaction appears to be a
serious challenge to the efficient market hypothesis because a
price downward drift means that the market is incapable of
translating information into prices. Nevertheless, the re-
duced effect of the news on CDS prices indicates a new
feature of the quotations’ behaviour. It is also worth noting
that if we look at the frequency of the positive and negative
announcements over the reference years, there is an overall
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Figure 2: Event study timeline.
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Globally, the sample allows ascertaining that the sov-
ereign risk market tends to value new information about
macroeconomic fundamentals positively. However, other
variables may influence the direction of the drift.
Moreover, a Wilcoxon signed rank test (Wilcoxon [23]
shows that the differential (&e difference in the effect is
computed by subtracting the absolute value of the cumu-
lative abnormal spread changes for worse-than-expected
news from the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal
spread changes for better-than-expected news.) in the effect
of the better- and worse-than-expected news is statistically
different from zero (see Table 6). Hence, it is possible to
conclude that the market values positive surprises more
strongly than negative surprises within the estimated
interval.
4.2. Reaction to Individual Fundamental News
Announcements. Since the aforementioned results capture
new features of the behaviour of sovereign CDS premiums, it
appears worthwhile to deepen the knowledge and determine
the effects of the individual fundamentals.&is approach will
help attribute the price patterns to the specific variables. For
the sake of the analysing individual variables, we create GDP,
CPI, unemployment rate, and consumer sentiment news
indices for both good and bad realisation/expectation sur-
prises, and we cross-test them over the entire sample. &e
numerical test results and discussion are given in the 8 tables
from Table 7 to Table 14, for the four macroeconomic in-
dicators, respectively.
4.2.1. Gross Domestic Product. &e effect of better-than-
expected GDP news does not provoke any abnormal spread
reaction on the 18 countries in the sample. &e overall
change is in line with the literature, as it is found that good
news lowers CDS premiums both in the short [−1; 1] and
longer [−20; 20] event window.
Similarly, sovereign risk indicators do not appear to
instantaneously abnormally react to worse-than-expected
GDP news. Additionally, CDS prices show the tendency of
not incorporating the national output communications very
quickly. In reality, the fact that current GDP announcements
are not effective enough to cause a substantial reaction in the
main event window should not be surprising. Goldberg and
Leonard [20] and Heinz and Sun [9] agree that the major
effect on CDS spreads is due to the forward-looking indi-
cators that reflect the future domestic health of the economy.
Nevertheless, the anticipation and postdrift effects represent
an advance in CDS price behaviour analysis.
4.2.2. Consumer Price Index. CPI is another macroeconomic
fundamental that is not conventionally considered to be
forward-looking. Interestingly, both good and bad news
indices provoke a consistent change in the CDS spreads in
the long run, and only better-than-expected information
induces an abnormal reaction in the sovereign CDS market.
An interesting feature is derived from the event study results.
Although very significant, positive surprises cumulatively
lower CDS premiums by 875 basis points in the 41-day
reference interval and increase them by 324 basis points in
the 3-day window. A potential explanation, combined with
the stronger impact of more powerful determinants and
spillover effects, is the fact that new information regarding
inflation is often difficult to interpret. Indeed, an average
hike in the price levels can be positively evaluated by de-
flationary countries and can counteract a plunge in prices.
Hence, due to our variable sample, we can impute the in-
creasing effect of CPI news to the specific country-related
domestic conditions.
Table 4: Impact of better-than-expected news for all countries.
All countries Better-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −398 bps −0.87 −0.16 −0.32 5.11∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
[−1; 1] −236 bps −1.91∗ −0.84 −0.92 −0.88 2.15∗∗ 0.046∗∗
[0; 0] −31 bps −0.43 −0.15 −0.13 −1.50 2.54∗∗ 0.018∗∗
&e symbols, ∗∗∗ , ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 5: Impact of worse-than-expected news for all countries.
All countries Worse-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −1053 bps −2.04∗∗ −0.83 −1.57 4.93∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
[−1; 1] −188 bps −1.34 −0.88 −0.96 0.71 1.86∗ 0.83
[0; 0] −228 bps −2.83∗ −2.24∗∗ −2.13∗∗ −2.38∗∗ −0.50 0.64
&e symbols ∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 6: Wilcoxon singed rank test results.
All countries Wilcoxon signed rank test
Event window [−1; 1]
CAASCs bad news 188 bps
CAASCs good news 236 bps
Difference in effects 48 bps(0.025)∗∗
&e symbol ∗∗ corresponds, respectively, to a significance level of 5%.
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Table 7: Impact of better-than-expected GDP news.
All countries Better-than-expected GDP news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −763 bps −0.68 −0.29 −0.63 1.30 0.33 0.75
[−1; 1] +73 bps 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.87 1.43 0.18
[0; 0] +56 bps 0.32 0.46 0.47 −0.19 1.31 0.27
Table 8: Impact of worse-than-expected GDP news.
All countries Worse-than-expected GDP news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −1033 bps −0.75 −0.60 −1.53 2.51∗∗ 1.41 0.23
[−1; 1] +179 bps 0.48 0.94 0.99 0.03 2.09∗∗ 0.08∗
[0; 0] −237 bps −1.10 −0.92 −1.21 −1.77∗ −0.55 0.62
&e symbols ∗∗ and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 5% and 10%.
Table 9: Better-than-expected CPI news impact event study results.
All countries Better-than-expected CPI news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −857 bps −1.10 0.02 0.05 3.38∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 0.04∗∗
[−1; 1] +324 bps 1.54 2.33∗∗ 2.10∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
[0; 0] +20 bps 0.17 0.74 0.55 0.68 1.38 0.19
&e symbols ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1% and 5%.
Table 10: Worse-than-expected CPI news impact event study results.
All countries Worse-than-expected CPI news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −1448 bps −1.59 −0.79 −1.65∗ 2.56∗∗ 1.39 0.16
[−1; 1] +137 bps 0.55 1.28 1.11 2.56∗∗ 2.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
[0; 0] +9 bps 0.06 0.84 0.64 1.58 1.26 0.21
&e symbols ∗∗ and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 5% and 10%.
Table 11: Better-than-expected UR news impact event study results.
All countries Better-than-expected UR news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −903 bps −1.11 −0.43 −0.80 2.20∗∗ 1.49 0.16
[−1; 1] −204 bps −0.93 −0.49 −0.55 −1.21 0.97 0.38
[0; 0] +26 bps 0.21 0.57 0.60 0.36 2.03∗∗ 0.07∗
&e symbols ∗∗ and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 5% and 10%.
Table 12: Worse-than-expected UR news impact event study results.
All countries Worse-than-expected UR news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −539 bps −0.52 0.20 0.38 2.74∗∗∗ 1.46 0.16
[−1; 1] −133 bps −0.47 −0.43 −0.51 0.37 1.96∗∗ 0.09∗
[0; 0] −55 bps −0.34 −0.77 −0.90 0.37 1.02 0.42
&e symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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4.2.3. Unemployment Rate. Sovereign CDS quotations do
not react very strongly to positive unemployment rate news.
&e effect is not statistically significant in both short and
long time intervals. Prices’ response to positive expectation/
realisation surprises is akin to negative news because they
both cause a drop in the spread levels. &e same pattern can
be spotted if the entire sample is taken into account.
Moreover, the incorporation of the new information set
appears to occur instantaneously with no evidence of price
adjustments, as documented by Hull et al. [19]. Since it is
unanimously agreed that good surprises lower the risk
perception of a country, it is interesting to attribute the same
reaction to bad surprises. It is possible to state with a high
degree of certainty that the effect is time period-related and
Table 13: Impact of better-than-expected CS news.
All countries Better-than-expected CS news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] +446 bps 0.42 0.96 1.80∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗ 0.01∗∗
[−1; 1] −193 bps −0.67 −0.35 −0.49 −2.39∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
[2; 20] +278 bps 0.38 0.84 1.75∗ 4.42∗∗∗ 1.71∗ 0.11
[0; 0] −34 bps −0.21 −0.65 −0.96 −2.82∗∗∗ 1.86∗ 0.31
&e symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 14: Impact of worse-than-expected CS news.
All countries Worse-than-expected CS news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −910 bps −0.88 −0.25 −0.43 2.38∗∗ 1.28 0.21
[−1; 1] −341 bps −1.22 −1.56 −2.18∗∗ −0.69 1.48 0.20
[0; 0] −234 bps −1.71∗ −1.69∗ −2.57∗∗∗ −2.09∗∗ −1.13 0.32
&e symbols ∗∗ and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 5% and 10%.
Table 15: Impact of better-than-expected news on EMEA countries.
EMEA Better-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −141 bps −0.20 0.19 0.36 4.57∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗ 0.03∗∗
[−1; 1] −361 bps −1.86∗∗ −1.47 −1.89∗ −1.38 1.54 0.15
[0; 0] −75 bps −0.67 −0.92 −1.00 −2.59∗∗∗ 1.80∗ 0.11
&e symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 16: Impact of worse-than-expected news on EMEA countries.
EMEA Worse-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −191 bps −0.26 0.15 0.29 4.44∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗ 0.03∗∗
[−1; 1] −352 bps −1.80∗ −1.43 −1.84∗ −1.31 1.67∗ 0.12
[0; 0] −74 bps −0.65 0.87 −0.94 −2.61∗∗∗ 1.84∗ 0.09∗
&e symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 17: Impact of better-than-expected news on American countries.
Americas Better-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] +70 bps 0.54 2.64∗∗∗ 1.74∗ −1.10 1.91∗ 0.09∗
[−1; 1] +54 bps 1.52 1.91∗ 1.55 0.12 1.80∗ 0.07∗
[0; 0] +26 bps 1.27 1.35 1.00 −0.29 1.08 0.30
&e symbols ∗∗∗ and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1% and 10%.
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is mainly caused by other movers’ fluctuations that offset our
indicator’s result. &e financial indicators are some of these
major movers. Since our study focuses on the period be-
tween two financial crises, it is reasonable that monetary
policy actions and interest rates news are more valuable for
market investors. Furthermore, an increase in the labour
market workforce may be perceived as temporary and due to
a new injection of money into the economy that is not always
considered to be risk-reducing.
4.2.4. Consumer Sentiment. &is indicator is based on the
consumers’ perception of economic health. Amid the in-
dicators that we are taking into account, this is an indicator
of better proxies forward-looking factors. Remarkable im-
pacts are observed for good and bad news surprises.Whereas
better-than-expected news causes a hike in the CDS prices
and the effect only shows up in the [−20; 20] event window,
driven by a postannouncement drift, a negative news sur-
prise provokes a plunge in the premiums and is quickly
incorporated in the price levels. In this case, the price ad-
justment is observed to occur immediately. Hence, it is
reasonably arguable that a weak form of market efficiency
holds as publicly available information is well processed into
sovereign CDS prices.
4.3. Reaction in Different Regions. &e last research question
assesses the responsiveness of the single areas in order to
understand which macroregions are more sensitive to
macroeconomic fundamentals. For each macro area, we
investigate both positive and negative surprises’ impacts.&e
test results and their discussion are given in the following.
We can see different patterns of responses in different re-
gions. &is can be explained by other factors such as
commodity including oil markets’ impact on CDS spreads,
as pointed out by Bouri et al. [24], Bouri et al. [25], and Bouri
et al. [26].
4.3.1. Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA).
Tables 15 and 16 report the results on EMEA countries.
Consistent with the whole sample results, publicising both
good and bad macroeconomic fundamentals lowers CDS
spreads. In addition to the statistical significance of the 3-day
event window for the news indices, we find that CDS pre-
miums experience an overall decrease over the [−20; 20]
reference period.&e impact corresponds to 141 basis points
for better-than-expected news and 191 for worse-than-ex-
pected news. &e reason why CDS premiums drop is
explained by Conrad et al. [15]. When a financial system
experiences a period of distress, all asset prices tend to react
more strongly to positive news than to negative information.
&erefore, the effect of bad news is offset by the positive
impact. Furthermore, in line with the literature, our results
show that good news lowers risk perception in the sovereign
market.
&e EMEA region has recently undergone a period of
general instability that was characterised by sovereign in-
debtedness. &us, the sample is split into two subsamples in
order to isolate the effect of the sovereign debt crisis and
examine not only the impact it had on the sovereign CDS
Table 19: Impact of better-than-expected news on Asian Pacific countries.
Asia pacific Better-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] −71 bps −0.49 1.33 0.92 −0.50 1.10 0.27
[−1; 1] −28 bps −0.71 −0.32 −0.28 −0.92 −0.64 0.53
[0; 0] +20 bps 0.88 1.13 1.11 1.21 0.98 0.36
Table 20: Impact of worse-than-expected news on Asian Pacific countries.
Asia pacific Worse-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] +458 bps 2.64∗∗∗ 4.71∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗ 0.04∗∗
[−1; 1] +24 bps 0.50 1.56 1.07 0.51 1.60 0.10∗
[0; 0] +11 bps 0.41 0.58 0.52 2.12 0.98 0.36
&e symbols ∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 18: Impact of worse-than-expected news on American countries.
Americas Worse-than-expected news
Test/event window Caasc t-test Adjusted Patell test BMP test Generalized sign test Skewed-adjusted test Bootstrap p value
[−20; 20] +341 bps 2.49 4.37∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 4.34∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
[−1; 1] +33 bps 0.89 1.53 1.36 2.23∗∗ 1.00 0.32
[0; 0] +13 bps 0.63 1.61 1.47 0.98 0.60 0.54
&e symbols ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ correspond, respectively, to a significance level of 1% and 5%.
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market but also if it caused a change in the effectiveness of
the macroeconomic fundamentals on asset prices. We ex-
tend the first subsample from June 1, 2009, to November 1,
2012. &e second subsample is from November 2, 2012, to
June 1, 2016.
It is very interesting to note that during the European
sovereign debt crisis, none of the indicators in the analysis
appear to soar at all because of the abnormal spread changes.
&e period immediately following the debt crisis is relatively
more tranquil, which is confirmed by the fact that the results
are entirely different from the previous case. However,
better-than-expected news has an increasing effect on the
CDS premiums, and this is true for both the event date and
the 41-day window.
Overall, we can state with a high degree of certainty that
during the debt crisis, CDS quotations were almost unaf-
fected by the four indicators that we take into account,
confirming that the risk perception shifted towards more
conditioning unconventional indicators such as future
growth variables or financial measures. One possible
driving force of European CDS premiums may be the
unconventional monetary policy (i.e., quantitative easing or
QE) implemented by the European central bank, as Kin-
ateder andWagner [27] found that QE has indeed helped to
lower yield spreads for sovereign bonds in the short
window.
4.3.2. Americas and Asian Pacific Countries. Central and
Latin American (see Tables 17–18) and Asian Pacific
countries (see Tables 19–20) are the most affected by the
macroeconomic surprises. Since a large part of the sample is
composed of developing countries, these results are in line
with Hull et al. [19] and Yildirim [28]. &e study of the effect
of news on emerging markets shows that they tend to react
more strongly to macroeconomic fundamentals than to fi-
nancial indicators. Apart from a lack of better-than-expected
news significance on Asian countries, all the other event
studies show evidence for both an abnormal cumulative
change in the [−1; 1] event window and in a slightly longer
term.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we initially conduct an event study to test the
significance of the impact of gross domestic product, con-
sumer price index, unemployment rate, and consumer
sentiment announcement on sovereign credit default swap
premiums. &en, we investigate the pre- and post-
announcement drifts in order to check whether a weak form
of market efficiency is verified in the sovereign risk market.
We employ an event study methodology that allows us to
estimate the magnitude of the news effects over several event
windows. &e dataset comprises the historical credit default
swap data for 18 countries representing three macroregions:
EMEA, Americas, and Asia Pacific.&e news information set
is divided into better- and worse-than-expected news based
on the differential between the released value and the
economic market consensus.
&is study extends the analysis on CDS spreads to date
and provides another angle to interpret sovereign CDS
premium dynamics to investors. Considering that the set of
macroeconomic fundamentals is only one determining level
from which it is possible to investigate the news impact and
is also highly time varying, we examine the effectiveness of
four nonconventional fundamentals on the credit deriva-
tive’s prices. An alternative approach from the literature is
used, as the theory only focuses on forward-looking indi-
cators that are found to account for 65% of the premiums’
changes. &e four indicators only reflect the current eco-
nomic health that may be considered the basis for fore-
casting. Focusing on these indicators appears to be
worthwhile because it allows to check whether the impact of
the financial subprime mortgages crisis has led to a turning
point in the effect of news in the sovereign risk market.
Moreover, we try to provide the investors that further in-
formation concerning the behaviour of sovereign CDS prices
over a nonconventional economic period featured by the
sovereign debt crisis. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no previous report of an event study about the impact
of non-forward-looking macroeconomic fundamentals
news on sovereign CDS premiums. Very few studies cover
the news reaction in the CDS market, and they mainly focus
on the spillover effects using regression techniques that
appear to be suitable for testing the CDS determinants but
are quite limited in the analysis of market efficiency and pre-
and postrelease drifts. Hence, we contribute to the expansion
of knowledge of credit default swap prices’ behaviour.
Overall, our findings suggest that the macroeconomic
announcement reduces the uncertainty of the sovereign CDS
market, and the announcements are still quite effective in the
generation of abnormal spread changes. Both longer and
shorter event windows are helpful for explaining the CDS
premiums’ reaction because they provide the investors with
useful information. In particular, for institutional investors
who dominate this market, they need to closely monitor the
behavior of CDS prices in their hedging processes and risk
dynamics. Our results highlight the fact that the CDS price
reaction to bad news should be very carefully interpreted,
and their strategy should be time-varying and requires
continuous revision.
Many gaps can still be filled concerning this topic. We
suggest the extension of the news dataset to include other
variables such as current account balance and negative in-
terest rates as well as other variables that we do not include
due to the lack of consistent and regular data. Another
interesting variable to investigate is the announcement of
QE. Based on the results of Kinateder and Wagner [27], QE
may lower the CDS in the short window, but its effect in the
long run may be ambiguous since on the one hand, it in-
creases the liquidity of market, but on the other hand, it may
intensify the anxiety of market if its effect turns out to be
limited, as we have observed in the market turbulence in the
US in the spring of 2020.
Furthermore, a more accurate selection of the CDS
historical prices that may employ further statistical analysis
of the countries is recommended. Spillover effects and pe-
riod-related responses may affect the overall findings.
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&erefore, an analysis in which the domestic effects are
isolated from international impulses would be more specific.
However, the CDS market is dropping in terms of the
notional amount of outstanding contracts, and, therefore, we
assume that future investigations will be harder due to a lack
of large quantities of data.
Data Availability
&e data required to reproduce these findings cannot be
shared at this time as the data also form part of an ongoing
study.
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